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Abstract
Since the Greenland Self-Government Act came into force in 2009, economic development and
the right to utilize natural resources in Greenland lies in the hands of the Self-Government. Earlier
efforts to establish this authority were made back in the 1970s, when discussions on Home Rule
were first on the agenda. Mining industries are not a new activity in Greenland. During the Second
World War, Greenlandic cryolite was used to produce aluminum for the North American aircraft
industry. Other essential natural resources, such as gold and gemstones, have also received
international interest over the years. Greenland’s new development aim is to build up a large-scale
mining industry. This article elucidates the form of public consultation processes followed in
Greenland in connection with two large-scale mining projects and the different views various actors
have regarding these events. How did the deliberative democratic process unfold in Greenland
regarding these projects? Was the process followed an effective way to manage these kinds of
projects? The article shows that two projects that received a lot of media attention: the 2005 iron
ore mine project in Isukasia, and the 2001 TANBREEZ-project to extract rare earth elements, used
highly different approaches when it comes to deliberative democracy. In the former case, a limited
degree of deliberative democracy was used, while in the latter case, the opposite applies.
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1. Introduction
In the process of building up Greenland’s mining industry after the Government of
Greenland took over the mineral resources sector,1 heavy criticism against the
procedures and processes around the extractive industries has come from various
stakeholders. The local populations in the areas where mining will take place feel that
they have not received enough information about all of the challenges and possible
impacts of the mining projects,2 even though several public consultation processes
have been carried out. One of the biggest criticisms is that locals were first included
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in the process at a late stage, and after all major decisions had already been made.
Some politicians claim that people were informed several years ago, and that current
developments should therefore not have come as a surprise. There are thousands of
pages of technical data available on the Internet about each of the projects, but these
documents are difficult to read and interpret. Another problem lies in the form of the
public consultation processes themselves. They primarily consisted of information
meetings to the public, and did not take the form of consultation processes more
frequently used, for instance, in Canada, where various actors and stakeholders are
involved from the beginning to the end, and therefore have more influence on
decisions made.
Public consultation and participation in these large-scale mining projects has to be
viewed against a backdrop of wider political participation. Political and economic
development in Greenland has progressed rapidly. It is therefore important to
examine how public or political participation has evolved in a general context in
order to analyze the forms of public consultation and hearing processes now taking
place in relation to Social Impact Assessments (SIAs) and other processes related to
the extractive industry.
Political participation applies to all forms of political actions made by individuals.
In democracies, the most obvious form of political participation is through voting in
elections, consultation processes, referendums and so on. Aside from government
initiatives, other forms of action include demonstrations, boycotts and more
aggressive forms of action, such as the occupation of buildings.3 The promotion of
active citizenship as a new form of participation seen is a shift in government towards
a form of ‘‘governing through communities’’ where citizens share responsibility for
the defense of citizen rights as a strategy of increasing participation in the political
process. Examples include parents raising funds for schools, residents joining
‘‘neighborhood watch’’ schemes to guard against crime, and other forms of civic
participation that extend beyond the act of voting.4
In the literature on the issue of political participation, three ideal models are
usually referred to: electoral democracy, participatory democracy and deliberative
democracy. The first model of electoral democracy refers to the act of voting as the
main channel for citizens to influence politics. After election day, responsibility is
transferred to the elected representatives. The second model of participatory
democracy emphasizes more participation from citizens in the form of active
participation in decision-making. This form is realized through the decentralization
of politics to local communities. The third model of deliberative democracy focuses
on a process of dialogue and discussion to influence political decisions directly and
not through representatives, and where arguments compete against each other before
a decision is eventually made.5
All three forms of democratic participation are evident in the Greenlandic
community. The element of electoral democracy is, however, quite young, since
historically Greenland has been ruled by Denmark under the auspices of colonial
rule from 1721 to 1953. The colonial framework gave Greenlanders limited room for
political participation. With the integration of Greenland into the Danish realm,
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some political participation was made possible, and eventually when Home Rule was
introduced in 1979, a regional political system with elections was created. The
extended self-rule established in 2009 has further broadened the scope of political
participation for Greenlandic citizens. Participatory democracy is used on the local
level within the municipalities, even though this form has been somewhat restricted
due to municipal reforms that took place in 2009, reducing the number of
municipalities from 18 to 4. Deliberative democracy is the closest Greenland has
to public consultation processes or hearing processes in relation to the mining
industry projects. This is not the only context that deliberative democracy is used.
It is tradition in Greenland to conduct hearing processes regarding law proposals
on general matters.6 Is the deliberative democracy model feasible and what are
the benefits and drawbacks of using such a model in the context of economic
development in Greenland? How can the hearing processes be improved if there is a
lack of trust and legitimacy amongst the population?
Section 2 of the article provides a short history of Greenland’s legislative
competencies in the field of mineral resources. Section 3 examines the current
situation in relation to Self-Government, Sections 4 and 5 present case studies of
the Isukasia-project and the TANBREEZ-project and compare the two projects.
The final section draws conclusions based on the findings in the article.
2. A short history of Greenland’s mineral resources competencies
Mining projects have been part of Greenland’s history since the 19th century.
Cryolite, a raw material once important to the aluminum smelting process, was
mined until resources were depleted in 1987.7
The first law in relation to onshore and offshore industrial extraction in Denmark
was passed in 1932. At this time, it was only possible to enforce laws in Greenland
through a Royal Decree, which was passed in 1935, applying the same Danish law
within the area.8 Greenland was still a colony at the time, so all major decisions were
made in Copenhagen.
The Danish law on industrial extraction was modified in 1950, and stated that
‘‘Resources in Greenland soil belonged to the Danish state.’’ Administration in
Greenland was centralized, and a directly-elected provincial council was established
in Nuuk with a single governor. In 1953, Greenland became an integral part of the
Danish Realm as a county, and Denmark awarded Greenland two representatives in
the Danish parliament.9 In January 1960, the Danish Ministry for Greenland
appointed a commission to prepare a specific law on mineral resources in Greenland.
The outcome of this work was a law, which was implemented in 1965. The aim of the
law was to attract foreign investors to invest in extraction activities in Greenland.10
In 1975, political negotiations between Greenland and Denmark took place
regarding the future constitutional status of Greenland. Greenland had been an
integrated part of Denmark as a county since 1953, but this was now about to
change. Political mobilization against postcolonial rule was on the agenda, and
Greenland wanted more autonomy. The negotiations ended in a 1979 referendum
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on Home Rule, following the Faroese model. A majority of the Greenlandic
population voted in favor of Home Rule.11
During the negotiations between Denmark and Greenland on Home Rule, the
issue of ownership of minerals and petroleum in the subsoil of Greenland was
discussed, but a separate 1978 law (Law on minerals in Greenland) established joint
administration and responsibility over the area. A committee consisting of an equal
number of Greenlandic and Danish parliamentarians was to make decisions on
permits to companies who wished to start operations in Greenland. The adminis-
tration of the committee was situated in Denmark under the jurisdiction of the
Danish Minister for Greenland.12 Home Rule in Greenland was established in 1979,
giving Greenland full control over administration of the country in self-financed
areas and some control over policy implementation in spheres subsidized from
Denmark, but as mentioned above, natural resources were considered as a joint
matter.
In 1988, the 1978 Danish law was amended for the first time. The principle
of sharing revenues from the extractive field shifted in favor of Greenland. The
joint Greenlandic-Danish company, Nunaoil A/S (established in 1985), was also
strengthened. This was also a result of the 1985 Greenlandic referendum, the
outcome of which led Greenland to leave the European Economic Community
(EEC). In 1991, minor changes were made to the 1978 Danish Law, the most
significant of which was the requirement to provide more information to the public in
Greenland about all activities going on. Furthermore, the administration of hydro-
power activity was moved from the sphere of joint affairs between Greenland and
Denmark to the Home Rule administration.13
In 1998 a further step towards managing extractive industries was taken when
the Greenlandic Home Rule Government established the Bureau of Minerals and
Petroleum (BMP). The Mineral Resources Act was passed in 2009 and came into
force in 2010. In article 1 the Act states the following:
1. This Greenland Parliament Act aims to ensure appropriate exploitation of
mineral resources and use of the subsoil for storage or purposes relating to
mineral resource activities as well as regulation of matters of importance to
mineral resource activities and subsoil activities.
2. The Greenland Parliament Act aims to ensure that activities under the Act are
performed in a sound manner as regards safety, health, the environment,
resource exploitation and social sustainability and appropriately and according
to acknowledged best international practices under similar conditions.14
This Act was a direct result of the introduction of Self-Government, which had
come into effect on 21 June 2009. In the Self-Government Act of 2009, §§78 are
related to incomes from the extractive industries.15 The Mineral Resources Act
regulates onshore and subsoil activities. The Act also states that all activities should
take social (health and safety), environmental and sustainability considerations in
mind. Furthermore, international practices and best practices are acknowledged.16
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This acknowledgement is also found in the Memorandum of Understanding that the
BMP signed with the National Energy Board in Canada in 2010. This agreement’s
purpose is to exchange experiences about management practices and issues
concerning the extractive industries. It is an agreement where ‘‘best practices’’ are
in the forefront regarding regulations and procedures within the field.17
3. Self-government and natural resources
On 1 January 2010, Greenland took over control of all subsurface resources, thus
paving the way for direct negotiations between the Greenlandic authorities and
multinational companies interested in investing in Greenland.18 In recent years, an
increasing number of mineral exploration licenses have been granted to foreign
mining companies, from Canada, Australia, the UK and other countries.19
Public involvement has become more active in recent years, starting with the first
protest campaign against offshore exploratory drilling for oil and gas west of central
Greenland in 197677. There have also been other protests, from both the public and
the Greenlandic parliament, but it was not until the 2000s that public involvement
was organized in the form of non-governmental organizations (NGOs), such as Avataq
and Inuit Circumpolar Council (ICC). Furthermore, Alcoa’ inquiry in 2006 to build
an aluminum smelter in Maniitsoq triggered politicians to demand that a Strategic
Environmental Assessment (SEA) be conducted in the process, even though no
legislative basis for such a process had ever been introduced in Greenland before.20
With the introduction of Self-Government, a new era in the extractive industries
began, and increasing numbers of Greenlanders have been hired as workers and given
relevant education in the field. These activities are followed closely by politicians,
non-governmental organization (NGOs), the public and the press. Almost every day
the local media (e.g. Kalaallit Nunaata Radioa/Greenlandic Broadcasting Corpora-
tion (KNR)), the newspapers (Sermitsiaq.ag and Atuagagdliutit/Grønlandsposten)
report on the industry.
BMP, a government agency under the Ministry of Industry and Mineral
Resources, actively campaigned to encourage resource companies and investors to
think about exploration and exploitation opportunities in Greenland. In addition,
BMP was responsible for management, administrative and regulatory tasks regarding
petroleum and mineral resources and had sole authority and decision-making power
to issue licenses for prospecting, exploration and production.21 As of 1 January 2013,
BMP was renamed the Mineral License and Safety Authority (MLSA). The
responsibilities of the former BMP were distributed across several administrative
units  the Ministry of Industry and Minerals, and a new Environment Agency
for Mineral Resources Activities (EAMR), which falls under the Ministry of Nature
and Environment. This reorganization was the result of a revision of Greenland
Parliament Act No. 26 of 18 December 2012, an amendment of Greenland
Parliament Act No. 7 of 7 December 2009 (The Mineral Resources Act).22
The new Authority is an improvement, since now there is a separation between the
management of mineral resources and environmental management. This separation
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also takes the form of different supervisory and approval roles regarding strategic
planning and marketing.23 The EAMR safeguards environmental protection related
to oil extraction and mineral extraction in collaboration with the Danish Center for
Environment and Energy (DCE) at Aarhus University and the Greenlandic Institute
of Natural Resources (GINR). These two institutes together carry out strategic
environmental impact assessments (SEIAs) that determine which on- and offshore
areas should be opened for a licensing round.24
The ICC and the Employers’ Association of Greenland have taken a leading role
in the call for public debate on the nature of consultation and decision-making
processes in the extractive industries. In October 2012, ICC launched a project in
cooperation with WWF-Denmark to focus on improving hearing processes for large-
scale projects in Greenland. Transparency Greenland is another NGO that has tried
to influence decision-makers, addressing concerns regarding corruption within the
industry, and arguing that citizens should become more involved in the discussions
on legislation for large-scale projects.25 Another issue addressed by Transparency
Greenland has been to call for more streamlined procedures regarding public
consultation, and also to improve access to relevant documents, which are often only
in English and not translated into Danish and/or Greenlandic.26
The Government of Greenland has also taken steps towards getting the public
more involved in the process. One of the Government’s major goals is to inform and
involve citizens and other stakeholders in the planning of future mining projects
through a variety of activities, including meetings, focus groups, interviews,
communication via media sources, seminars, conferences and mass meetings.27
Public participation is usually integrated in environmental impact assessment (EIA)
and SIA processes, since the authorities often require public consultations as part of
EIA and SIA preparations. However, there are no clear guidelines for how public
consultations or hearing processes should be conducted.28 In the Mineral Resources
Act (MRA) of Greenland it states that a license for approval of a mineral activity can be
granted only after an assessment has been made of the impact on the environment
(EIA) or when a social sustainability assessment (SSA) has been conducted.29 In the
2014 revisions of the MRA an additional Part 18a, §§87ad requires pre-consultation
and consultation for large-scale projects.30 In the Aarhus Convention, this is one of the
international conventions that guarantees access to information, public participation
and access to justice in environmental issues, Denmark made a reservation for
Greenland. Greenland has yet to ratify the Convention.31 Public consultations or
hearing processes are used to mitigate conflicts and serve as a tool for information
exchange between various stakeholders, and may also enhance mutual learning
processes and act as a means to avoid costly delays with large-scale projects.32
3.1. Formal process for public consultation in Greenland
The formal process of public consultation or outlining a Social Impact Assessment is
comprised of multiple stages, but is straightforward33: 1) First, there is a scope study,
which is a pilot study over the planning and collection of data for the place of the
project. During this phase, all relevant stakeholders are informed and should
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participate regarding the matters to be investigated in such a scope study; 2) after the
scope study is completed, there is a 35-day public consultation. During this period,
stakeholders can apply for funding to undertake investigations of their own. This new
and improved procedure was implemented in 2014. The initiative helps locals,
NGOs and associations gather information from neutral sources already at the stage
of the scope study; 3) when all information has been gathered and the scope study
and the public consultation approved, the next procedure is for the company to write
the terms of reference. This terms of reference document is then sent to the
authorities for approval. The terms of reference is a more detailed document and can
be seen as a committee report. This document is not submitted for a public hearing;
4) a draft for an SIA and an EIA is the next step in the process, if the project is
considered to have a significant impact on society. During this stage the document(s)
constitute the basis of the next public consultation. The public hearings span
8 weeks. The form these public consultation meetings take can vary, and can include:
stakeholder meetings, local meetings with citizens, public hearings and/or informa-
tion meetings; 5) the White Book is then written. The purpose of the White Book is
to address relevant concerns raised during the public consultation meetings. All
of the concerns raised should be included in this document; 6) the next step is
the three-party negotiations regarding the Impact Benefit Agreement (IBA). This is
the agreement between the authorities (municipality and the government) and the
company. The IBA is published after it is approved34; 7) after all these stages, and if
the project has been successfully outlined in each phase, the final version of the
White Book together with the final versions of SIA and EIA are sent to the
government for political approval. The Government of Greenland will then either
accept or reject the proposal for exploitation.35
The procedure is illustrated in Figure 1:
The deliberative democratic ideal takes citizen participation into account. Citizens
should be able to be involved in the process of decision-making and be able to
influence political decisions directly and not through representatives. Interests should
Scope Study
Public 
Consultation (35 
days)
Terms of 
Reference
SIA (and EIA) Draft + 
Application for 
Exploitation
Public 
Consultation 
(8 weeks)
White Book Three Party 
Negotiations
(IBA)
Final Version of 
SIA, EIA, White 
Book and IBA
Political 
Acceptance/ 
Rejection
Figure 1. The formal process of applying for licenses.
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not be contradictory, and all participants should be economically independent and
have the same access to information.36 This is, of course, an ideal form of
deliberative democracy. There are several concerns that can be addressed in relation
to the process of large-scale projects in Greenland. First, the companies have a large
degree of knowledge in their field. They usually also have expert resources available
in their companies. Second, the authorities have first-hand information on every
project that is in progress, and may also have experts that provide consulting or
advisory support. In comparison, the municipal authorities and local citizens can be
seen as resource-weak stakeholders. This also applies to NGOs and other interest
organizations within society. Access to knowledge and information can therefore be
on an unequal footing. Third, the practice of public consultation might not be
implemented in a meaningful way, and the situation that Greenland has not ratified
the Aarhus Convention is problematic. Another consideration is specific cases of
large-scale projects, which can vary significantly from case to case. In the next
section, two examples cases are examined with regard to the public consultations
processes undertaken so far in relation to the deliberative democratic feature.
4. Two case studies
In this section the London Mining Greenland A/S, or Isukasia-project, and the
TANBREEZ-project are outlined.
4.1. London Mining Greenland A/S or Isukasia-project
London Mining is a British company that produces high specification iron ore for the
global steel industry. London Mining has received a 30-year exploitation license for
their Isukasia-project in Greenland effective 24 October 2013.37
The iron ore resources at Isua were first discovered in 1965, but it was not until an
exploration drilling and feasibility campaign was undertaken by Marcona in the
1970s that the potential for open pit and underground mines was revealed, which
coincided with the development of a bulk logistics route to a deep water port. Rio
Tinto carried out further exploratory drilling in the 1990s, and London Mining
acquired the Isua license in 2005.38
In 2012, London Mining Greenland A/S applied for exploitation rights, and later
signed the exploitation agreement. A public hearing phase and public community
meetings have been completed.39
A potential mine will be able to produce around 15 million tons of ore concentrate
per year. The project is expected to employ more than 3000 employees during the
peak construction phase. When the mine moves into the production phase, the
company expects that employment levels will stabilize between 680 and 810
individuals.40 This means that a foreign labor force will have to be brought in to
cover the construction phase. London Mining intends to employ Chinese workers
not only for the construction phase, but throughout the whole process, including the
production phase.41
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London Mining conducted an SIA in 2009. During the period 27 August 2012 to
19 October 2012, BMP organized four public hearings. In addition, London Mining
organized a number of public consultation meetings with relevant stakeholders as
well as the public on general issues concerning engineering and the environment and
socio-economic impacts of the Isukasia-project.42
Public hearings were conducted on four main topics: a general information
session, a session about the SIA-process, a session about the EIA process and a
concluding session on all topics in the form of an open debate.43
From 2008 to 2012, London Mining implemented an extensive communication
plan and involvement with the local community. In 2011 and 2012, the company
held 10 public consultation workshops to discuss environmental, social and technical
aspects of the Isukasia-project with the local citizens. Furthermore, three large public
information meetings with media coverage and presentations were held in 2010 and
2011.44
The results of the hearing processes can be seen in light of both benefits and risks.
Some of the key benefits are economic and social. There will be opportunities for
both direct and indirect employment and local business development, as well as
increased opportunities for education and training. The risks can be summarized as
social conflicts between vulnerable groups in society and the risk of pollution and
accidents.45
As can be seen from Figure 2, the time frame for public consultation and involving
different actors was quite short for such a large-scale project. The scope study that
London Mining submitted was highly detailed. This process was completed before
the improved legislation came into force, and hence the public consultation period
where the SIA and EIA were discussed spanned only 4 weeks (currently 8 weeks). In
the public and media debates, the local people pointed to the potential negative
impacts the project would have and raised concerns regarding the environmental and
social impacts the project would have on hunting and the environment at large.46
The form the public consultation took is problematic. First of all, the company itself
Scope Study
2009–2011
Public Consultation
2010–11
Terms of 
Reference SIA and EIA 2012
Public 
Consultations:
27 August–19 
October 2012
White Book
March 2013
Negotiations 
around IBA
Final versions of 
important 
documents
Exploitation 
Awarded for 30 
years
24 October 2013
Figure 2. The formal process of London Mining.
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decided to what extent public consultation was carried out. Second, Naalakkersuisut
(Greenland’s Government) used a local consultancy firm with clients in the mining
sector to chair proceedings. During the hearings, which took place at Ilisimatusarfik
(the University of Greenland), company employees and consultants from Denmark
and Canada hired by London Mining summarized several thousand pages of
technical reports and other reports to get their message across. The hearings were
clearly information meetings and did not take the intended form of dialogue between
stakeholders.47
During the public hearing, people expressed their frustration over a lack of
democratic involvement  for example, the audience was told that questions could be
asked at the end of the meeting, but they would not be answered until the following
session. This is only a form of one-way communication to the public, and not the
real, deliberative form of discussion that is the purpose of such hearings.48 At a
minimum, public involvement must provide an opportunity for those directly
affected to express their views regarding the proposal and its environmental and
social impacts.
There have also been other signs of discontent. On Monday 26 November 2012,
around 20 people demonstrated outside the Greenlandic parliament building, over
the issue of using a foreign labor force. This was at the time when the MRA was up
for debate in the parliament. The demonstration was organized by ‘‘Foreningen 16.
August.’’ The name of the association was taken from an incident where BMP
banned local people from gathering red rubies and other gemstones in an area that
had attracted the interest of the Canadian company True North Gems.49 Several
demonstrations have been organized by different associations in Greenland against
other large-scale projects. This is a way of showing dissatisfaction with the way the
authorities are handling these matters. In Greenland, this can sometimes be an
effective way of dismantling the whole government, which happened recently over
the Aleqa-scandal (October 2014), when thousands of people demonstrated against
corruption in the Government.
Recently, London Mining has been affected by international problems, such as the
Ebola-epidemic in Africa and falling iron ore prices. The company’s financial
situation is ruined, and it is now under administration.50 The Isukasia-project has
therefore been put on hold. Other investors have come into the picture recently, such
as General Nice Development Limited, which is Hong Kong-based and has its main
operational center in Tianjin City on mainland China. General Nice Development
Limited is part of a conglomerate, meaning that business can go on. However, there
are a number of issues that need to be resolved before mining operations can
commence.51 Both external and internal problems and uncertainties can delay large-
scale projects of this magnitude.
4.2. The TANBREEZ-project
The TANBREEZ-project is an acronym for the minerals that will be extracted from
the mine. The project belongs to the Australian company Rimbal Pty. Ltd. headed by
Greg Barnes. TANBREEZ Mining Greenland A/S was established in 2010 and is
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100% owned by Greg Barnes. The project is close to some of Southern Greenland’s
major towns (Narsaq, Qaqortoq and Nanortalik) and only 38 km from the
international airport of Narsarsuaq.52 It is estimated that Kringlerne (the place
where the mine will be situated) contains 28 million metric tons of rare earth ore, of
which 30 percent is thought to be heavy rare earth elements (REE). Contrary to
many REE projects around the world, Kringlerne does not contain uranium or
thorium, making the refining process easier.53
A license for exploration was obtained in 2001 by Rimbal Pty. Ltd. The project
has offices in both Perth, Australia and Nuuk, Greenland. Currently, a team of
10 people is working on the project. An Environmental Impact Assessment and a
Social Impact Assessment were submitted in 2007 and 2010 respectively. Some field
investigations were conducted in 2010 and a feasibility study was completed in
2012.54
The project is expected to have duration of over 20 years, and the construction
phase is estimated to take 25 years. The expected workforce during both the
construction and operation phases is 80 persons. A yearly income when the mine is in
operation is to be expected to be about DKK 13 million.55
So far, the company has conducted a local use study, which was finalized in August
2013. The information in this study was based on interviews with local stakeholders
in South Greenland. Between the period of 21 February and 4 March 2008, 40
persons engaged in hunting, fishing, sheep farming, tourism, museum activities,
recreational use of natural areas, stone/mineral collection and public administration
were interviewed. In April 2010, five additional interviews were conducted by phone
with people living outside the towns, and later about 20 more interviews were
undertaken with fishermen and hunters in the area.56
TANBREEZ has also conducted an EIA and several reports have been written
about the natural environment, climate and hydrology, archeology and other relevant
fields during the EIA process.57
Concerns regarding the TANBREEZ-project have been of a different character
than concerns raised in connection with the Isukasia-project. The most obvious
concerns relate to the fishery interference, because the mining activities will lead to
more boat traffic in the area. Another issue is the risk of pollution and accidents.
On a more positive note, the TANBREEZ-project will lead to more direct and
indirect employment. The company has promised that 90% of its workforce will be
local during both the construction and production phases.58
There has been a request to extend the public hearings on the TANBREEZ-
project, which the company accepted 9 of December 2013. During the period
1719 November 2013, several public hearings took place in South Greenland. The
deadline was 6 January 2014 for commenting on these hearings.59 As can be seen in
Figure 3, the TANBREEZ-project has used interviews with local stakeholders and
public hearings as their primary way of communicating with the public. The process
has been quite transparent. Additional public hearings were held after the license for
exploitation was accepted. It seems that TANBREEZ’s policy has been to include as
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many stakeholders as possible from the beginning, and involve them in an ongoing
dialogue.
The current situation of the TANBREEZ-project is uncertain. The latest online
news is from 24 March 2014, which states that the company will participate in Hong
Kong at the Mines and Money Conference and the Alkaline Conference in Russia in
August 2015.60 The project is waiting to begin with the construction phase at the
moment.
5. Discussion
The two large-scale projects mentioned above are of a different character. All large-
scale projects in Greenland and elsewhere are usually evaluated and processed
individually, since mining is a complex procedure, especially when various minerals
are at stake. The nature of mining has become a very complex issue in the world at
large. It is as impossible to compare two mining projects as it is to compare two
mining countries with each other. Every project is unique and every context is
different.
As has also been argued, the companies’ policies differ in the way they have
included the public. London Mining had a clear top-down strategy: it decided what
kind of public hearings it wanted, and intended to employ a foreign workforce.
London Mining did not promise any significant involvement of local workers, instead
it looked towards China for both workers and funding. There has been a lot of
criticism directed towards the project during its progress as mentioned earlier in the
article, and now with the current unstable world market and world geopolitical
situation, the company is functioning under administration and can be said to be
more or less dysfunctional. The whole project has come to a halt, and the future is
uncertain, even with new investors.
Scope Study 
2008–10
Interviews 
21 February–4 
March 2008
Terms of 
Reference
SIA (2010) 
and EIA 
(2007)
Interviews 
/meetings 2010–
11 and Feasibility 
Study 2012
White Book Negotiations 
of IBA
All important 
documents 
delivered
February 2013
License for 
exploitation
6 September 
2013 
Figure 3. The formal process of the TANBREEZ-project.
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TANBREEZ has used a completely different approach. The company has actively
involved locals from the beginning, and used interviews to interact with various
stakeholders. Public hearings were held on several occasions, with additional
hearings scheduled following new developments. These hearings have helped build
trust with the local community. The policy has been more bottoms-up, where the
company has done everything according to the deliberative ideal. The company is
also promising to use locals as much as possible within the project.
In Canada, a commissioner has been appointed by the authorities to go through a
company’s application for mining rights. In this way, there is an independent party in
charge of involving stakeholders and the general public, promoting a more
democratic procedure. The commissioner is also in charge of public consultations
and hearings. Accordingly, the overall process has more legitimacy, and there is more
trust between the authorities, companies and the public.61 This could be an idea for
the Greenlandic authorities to take into account in the future.
6. Conclusion
The Government of Greenland, and especially the Ministry of Industry and Mineral
Resources and the Ministry of Nature and Environment, has worked on improving
the conditions and regulations regarding the mining sector continuously. The
amendments to the MRA from 2014 now include pre-consultation and consultation
in the Act. This is a learning process, and it will probably continue to be improved
for the years to come. It is evident that Greenland is not yet capable of handling
large-scale projects on its own, and is therefore dependent on external expertise in
this area.
The current economic situation makes it difficult to predict what will happen to all
of the ongoing mining projects in Greenland. Greenland’s economy, like that of
many other countries, is in bad shape and the country is highly dependent on
investment from abroad. However, with the recent decline in commodity prices on
the world market, it will probably take some time before the real mining adventure
becomes a reality.
Is deliberative democracy feasible in Greenland in relation to large-scale projects?
The answer would be both yes and no. This article is, of course, limited in that it only
takes two examples into account, but it does seem difficult to make deliberative
democracy work in the context of large-scale projects of the magnitude of the
Isukasia-project. With smaller projects like TANBREEZ, this process has proven
feasible. Much depends on the company’s policy and the agreements made with the
authorities in the first place. Another issue is how public consultation is conducted.
If it only takes the form of information meetings, no formal deliberative process
is at stake, but if the public, stakeholders and other interest groups are interviewed,
they become more involved in the process. The feasibility to use more direct
involvement in these kinds of projects also depends on the scale and what kind of
project it is.
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A large company with a top-down management style and clear hierarchical
structure might not be used to handling deliberative processes within the company
itself. It therefore becomes harder to use this form in other contexts, while a smaller
company might have a completely different approach to management and be used to
deliberative processes both within and outside the company’s framework. However,
this issue needs further investigation.
Legislation in the area of mineral resources is also crucial. The MRA in Greenland
might not cover all the aspects of the deliberative process or take into account its full
potential. It merely provides guidelines in this area and not clear regulations or
legislation. The fact that Greenland stands outside the Aarhus Convention should
also be stressed, since this piece of international law might help to improve the
deliberative process within this particular field.
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